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A New Look at an Old Concern- Protecting
Expert Information from Discovery
Under the Federal Rules
David M. Connors*
In 1978 and 1979, reports of the Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman
Kodak Co.' trial were the cause of much discussion and much conster-
nation in law offices around the country. Of particular concern to attor-
neys involved in large and complex antitrust litigation was and is the
question of how to best control relationships between counsel and the
various experts necessary in any such complex case in order to mini-
mize the 'potential for the release of confidential or unnecessarily em-
barrassing information during discovery or at trial. Without hesitation
it can be said that the destruction of documents or the intentional
withholding of documents responsive to proper discovery requests is
not the answer to the dilemma. But, as the Berkey case demonstrates,
even the most innocuous of preliminary correspondence with an expert
can become a devastating "smoking gun" if the circumstances so con-
spire.!
This article is divided into three sections. The first section presents
a general overview of the law with regard to discovery of expert infor-
mation. The following section attempts to respond to four specific
questions dealing with the scope of discovery of information given to
or received from experts who are retained in connection with litiga-
tion. Finally, the article concludes with some recommendations as to
measures that may be taken to legitimately protect as much sensitive
information as possible.
*B.A., 1974, Yale University; J.D., 1979, Brigham Young University. Mr. Connors is
currently a law clerk for Judge Ellsworth A. Van Graafeiland of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
1. 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), pet. for cert filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3224 (No. 79-499 Oct.
2, 1979).
2. Reference is made specifically to the so-called "interim report" of Kodak's
economic expert, Professor Merton J. Peck. This letter contained some clearly prelimi-
nary observations and might not have carried much weight were it not for the fact that
its existence was disclosed in dramatic fashion during cross-examination of Peck after the
jury had been made aware of the fact that other documents reviewed by Peck might have
been improperly destroyed by Kodak's counsel. For a full discussion of the Peck incident
see id. at 305-08.
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I. DISCOVERY OF EXPERT INFORMATION-GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
In a general sense, the one conclusion consistently borne out by the
cases dealing with the scope of discovery of expert information is that
in this area of the law very much is left to the whim, sometimes called
"discretion," of each particular judge. Although there is little of what
one might call hard and fast law in this area, there are guidelines set
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and by judicial precedent that
establish some limits, however vague, on the reach of the individual
judge's discretion.
The first restraint, and perhaps the only restraint rigidly adhered
to, is the language of Rule 26(b)(4)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure and its creation of a two-step process in the discovery of expert
information.' Under Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) the only permissible discovery of
expert information without a court order is in the form of answers to
interrogatories. In response to appropriate interrogatories, a party
must identify the experts expected to testify, state the subject matter
on which each expert is expected to testify, state the substance of the
facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify, and sum-
marize the grounds for each opinion.'
Some federal district courts go beyond this and require the disclo-
sure of reports of expert witnesses as an element of pretrial prepara-
tion.8 For example, the United States District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania has such a rule with regard to expert wit-
nesses in civil cases involving personal injuries.' This local rule re-
quires counsel for plaintiff, defendant, and third-party defendant to
serve upon each other a narrative written statement of the evidence to
be offered at trial and to attach to that statement a "copy of all
3. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A) reads:
(4) Trial Preparation" Experts. Discovery of facts known and opinions held by
experts, otherwise discoverable under the provisions of subdivision (b)(1) of this
rule and acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial, may be ob-
tained only as follows:
(A)(i) A party may through interrogatories require any other party to identify
each person whom the other party expects to call as an expert witness at trial, to
state the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, and to state the
substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify and a
summary of the grounds for each opinion. (ii) Upon motion, the court may order fur-
ther discovery by other means, subject to such restrictions as to scope and such
provisions, pursuant to subdivision (b)(4)(C) of this rule, concerning fees and ex-
penses as the court may deem appropriate.
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i).
5. See Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure: Part One, An Analytical Study, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 895, 931 & n.136 [here-
inafter cited as Graham].
6. W.D. PA. R. 5(II)(C)(2)(b), (3)(b) & (4)(b).
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reports containing the substance of the facts, findings, opinions and a
summary of the grounds or reasons for each opinion of any expert
whom a party expects to call as a witness at the trial." Although this
local procedure applies specifically only to personal injury actions, it
also is to be followed, "insofar as applicable, in all civil jury cases."7
Apparently, there is no similar requirement for nonjury actions,
although a particular judge might certainly request that such a pro-
cedure be followed.
In the absence of such local rules, however, there is no discovery
beyond the interrogatories permitted by Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) without a
court order pursuant to Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii). This latter rule allows the
court, upon motion, to "order further discovery by other means, sub-
ject to such restrictions as to scope .. .as the court may deem appro-
priate."8 Judicial interpretations and applications of this rule make it
clear that no further discovery will be ordered unless and until the
moving party has complied with the first step of the procedure, and
has sought information through interrogatories.'
There is no consensus of authority, however, on just how liberal (or
how limited) a discovery order pursuant to Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) should be.
Some courts allow virtually unlimited discovery of expert information,
requiring only that the party seeking discovery in the form of deposi-
tions or production of documents must agree to compensate the expert
or make some arrangement with the opposing party as to splitting the
expert's fee. Thus, in Quadrini v. Sikorsky Aircraft Division, United
Aircraft Corp.,"0 the court allowed a request for production of "all
reports, memoranda, papers, notes, studies, graphs, charts, tabulations,
analyses, summaries, data sheets, statistical or informational accumula-
tions, data processing cards or worksheets, and computer generated
documents, including drafts or preliminary revisions" of any of those
documents that were prepared in connection with the litigation by or
under the direction or supervision of any witness expected to be called
as an expert witness at the trial.1 By way of justification for its broad
ruling the court noted the highly technical nature of the lawsuit 2 and
stated that expert testimony would be crucial to the resolution of the
complex and technical factual disputes in the case, and that effective
cross-examination would be essential. Discovery of the reports of ex-
7. W.D. PA. R. 5(II(D).
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(ii).
9. See, e.g., United States v. International Business Machs. Corp., 72 F.R.D. 78, 81
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); United States v. John R.-Piquette Corp., 52 F.R.D. 370, 372 (E.D. Mich.
1971).
10. 74 F.R.D. 594 (D. Conn. 1977).
11. Id. at 594.
12. The suit involved a helicopter crash. See id
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perts, including the reports embodying preliminary conclusions, could
also guard against the possibility of a sanitized presentation at trial,
purged of less favorable opinions that had been expressed at an earlier
date." Similarly, in Herbst v. International Telephone & Telegraph
Corp. ," the court adopted a very liberal view toward the scope of fur-
ther discovery of expert information by deposition. The court stated:
"All but experts may be freely deposed before trial in keeping with
the liberal spirit that pervades the federal rules. Once the traditional
problem of allowing one party to obtain the benefit of another's expert
cheaply has been solved, there is no reason to treat an expert differ-
ently than any other witness.""
On the other hand, there are courts that seem much more willing to
limit the scope of discovery under Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii). In Breedlove v.
Beech Aircraft Corp. ,E the court denied a motion to compel production
of documents generated by experts in a products liability case. The
court said that the production of experts' reports should be governed
by Rule 26(b)(3)," which requires a showing of substantial need and un-
due hardship in obtaining the information elsewhere when a party
seeks production of "trial preparation" materials. The court specifically
noted that the materials being sought had been prepared by experts in
direct response to questions propounded by counsel. To encourage the
court to deny the motion, counsel for the party resisting discovery pro-
vided both the reports and the questions in response to which they
were prepared for the court to inspect in camera without prejudice to
any claim of privilege that might be asserted later. In its opinion deny-
ing the motion, the court quoted the language of Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) con-
cerning the permissible scope of interrogatories and then proclaimed:
The discovery of expert testimony is specifically limited to information of
this type, and (4)(A)(i) does not envisage the, production of written docu-
13. Id, at 595.
14. 65 F.R.D. 528 (D. Conn. 1975).
15. Id. at 530-31.
16. 57 F.R.D. 202 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) reads, in pertinent part:
(3) Trial Preparation Materials. Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4)
of this rule, a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things other-
wise discoverable under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation
of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's
representative (including his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or
agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of
the materials in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without undue
hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In
ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has been made,
the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions,




ments or reports on which expert opinions professedly rely. Plaintiffs
have failed to show unique or exceptional circumstances making it
equitable to require the production of expert reports at this stage of the
controversy, and they have been unable to demonstrate that they cannot
elicit the basis and scope of the expert opinions and supporting data of
each such opinion by simply following the rule as set forth in (4)(A)(i). 18
Similarly, in Wilson v. Resnick," the court, in a medical malpractice ac-
tion, denied a motion for production of an expert's report.. The court
found that the answers to the interrogatories were sufficient. Further-
more, the court stated that production of experts' reports would not be
ordered on a mere allegation that answers to interrogatories were in-
sufficient because "these reports are materials prepared in anticipation
of litigation," thus requiring a showing of substantial need (the Rule
26(b)(3) standard) before production would be ordered.2
In United States v. 145.31 Acres of Land,"1 the District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania required a showing of "compelling
need" to trigger production of experts' reports under Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii).
In summarizing its concept of the federal rules as they relate to dis-
covery of an expert's report, the court said:
Under Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, production of an
expert's report prior to or during trial may be required as a matter of
course only if the report is within the scope of Rule 26(b) unless the docu-
ment is used to refresh the recollection of a witness, which was not done
here. Rule 26(b)(4) provides in relevant portion for discovery of "the sub-
stance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify
and a summary of the grounds for each opinion." [emphasis supplied] It
thus appears that a party is not entitled as a matter of course to an ex-
pert's report itself nor to be informed of its location. Although the Court
has the power pursuant to Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) to order discovery beyond
these limits, the need for such discovery was not compelling here.'
This reading of Rule 26(b)(3) requirements into a motion for production
of an expert's report pursuant to Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) has been sharply
criticized by at least one commentator." Others, however, have noted
this tendency of some courts to superimpose the requirements of Rule
26(b)(3) on Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) when dealing with expert reports pre-
pared in anticipation of trial and have deemed it a very logical reading
of the rules in this area of overlap.
2
'
18. 57 F.R.D. at 204-05.
19. 51 F.R.D. 510 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
20. Id. at 511-12.
21. 54 F.R.D. 359 (M.D. Pa. 1972).
22. Id. at 360 (emphasis added).
23. See Graham, supra note 5, at 925-27.
24. See, e.g., Comment, Discovery of Expert Information Under the Federal Rules,




The decisions discussed above represent the more extreme views,
both liberal and conservative, on the scope of further discovery under
Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii). They give an idea of the latitude of the discretion
vested in the particular judge before whom a motion for further dis-
covery of expert information is made. Given this wide range of discre-
tion, it may be useful to catalogue some of the factors that courts have
mentioned as important in their consideration of the scope of Rule
26(b)(4)(A)(ii) discovery.
In United States v. International Business Machines Corp.,' the
court said that documents containing information transmitted by a party
to its experts are outside the scope of Rule 26(b)(4)(A) protection. The
court in this antitrust action accordingly ruled that "plaintiff is
directed to produce documents which were considered by . . . [its
economic experts] .. . in arriving at the opinions and conclusions to
which they will testify except to the extent that such documents con-
tain information generated by the expert."'
In E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,2 the
court was impressed by the close relationship between counsel and the
experts. Although the experts were members of the plaintiffs staff
and were, therefore, in-house experts, the court noted that "[tihese
technical experts worked closely with counsel and presumably under
direction of counsel. Moreover, there were frequent conferences be-
tween counsel and the experts. Reports of their work were sent to
counsel marked 'For Information of Counsel.' 28 Ultimately, the court
denied defendant's bid for production of the reports and other
materials generated by these experts.2
Along a similar line, one commentator discussing the attorney-client
privilege as it relates to an accountant retained by counsel has warned
that there must be "affirmative action" taken with regard to docu-
ments and has suggested "placing them in segregated files as distin-
guished by indiscriminate mingling with other routine documents
without special protection."' As noted earlier, in Breedlove v. Beech
Aircraft Corp. ,8 the court denied a motion for production of documents
generated by experts. In so doing, the court emphasized that the
25. 72 F.R.D. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
26. Id. at 82.
27. 23 F.R.D. 237 (D. Del. 1959).
28. Id. at 239.
29. Id.
30. Levy, Limitation Under Federal Law on Confidentiality Involving Accountants,
Accountants-Attorneys, and Accountants Retained by Attorneys, 82 CoM. L.J. 5, 8 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Levy].
31. 57 F.R.D. 202 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
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reports of the experts were prepared in direct response to questions
propounded by counsel."
On the other hand, courts that have allowed very liberal discovery
have pointed to factors such as the highly complex and technical
nature of the facts" and the "liberal spirit" of the federal rules." A
review of the cases suggests the following arguments that could be
made in opposition to motions for further discovery under Rule 26(b)(4)
(A)(ii).
1. The answers to interrogatories pursuant to Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) are
sufficient and thus further discovery is unnecessary."
2. Reports and other materials generated by experts are trial
preparation materials, discoverable only upon a showing of substantial
need for the materials and inability to obtain the substantial equiva-
lent by other means without undue hardship."
3. Production of reports and other materials would be unfair in
light of the expense and effort required in generating these materials."'
This list is, of course, not intended to be complete. There are indica-
tions in the cases reviewed of other arguments, including attempts to
shield expert information under the attorney work product doctrine or
the attorney-client privilege." Some of these arguments, however, have
lost much of their vitality due to the specific repudiation of privilege
or work-product protection in the Advisory Committee Notes to the
1970 revision of the rules."
II. SCOPE OF DISCOVERY OF EXPERT WITNESS
A. Discovery of Information in Areas Beyond the Scope
of the Expert's Anticipated Testimony
As currently written, Rule 26(b)(4) does not deal with the problem of
the expert who has prepared himself on multiple areas of a case but
32. 1& at 205.
33. See, e.g., Quadrini v. Sikorsky Aircraft Div., United Aircraft Corp., 74 F.R.D. 594,
595 (D. Conn. 1977).
34. Herbst v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 65 F.R.D. 528, 530 (D. Conn. 1975).
35. Breedlove v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 57 F.R.D. 202 (N.D. Miss. 1972); United States
v. 145.31 Acres of Land, 54 F.R.D. 359 (M.D. Pa. 1972); Wilson v. Resnick, 51 F.R.D. 510
(E.D. Pa. 1970).
36. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). See Breedlove v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 57 F.R.D. 202
(N.D. Miss. 1972); Wilson v. Resnick, 51 F.R.D. 510 (E.D. Pa. 1970). See also Discovery of
Expert Informatio7 supra note 24, at 719-21.
37. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(ii), 26(b)(4)(C). But see Quadrini v. Sikorsky Aircraft
Div., United Aircraft Corp., 74 F.R.D. 594 (D. Conn. 1977); Herbst v. International Tel. &
Tel. Corp., 65 F.R.D. 528 (D. Conn. 1975).
38. See, e.g., Breedlove v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 57 F.R.D. at 205.
39. See Advisory Committee Notes, 48 F.R.D. 487, 504-05 (1970).
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will only testify as to one area. Literally speaking, the rule only distin-
guishes between experts expected to testify at trial and experts not
expected to testify at trial. Therefore, if interpreted strictly, an expert
who will testify on any subject at trial could be subject to the more
pervasive discovery permitted under Rule 26(b)(4)(A) as to all work
that he has done related to the case. On the other hand, the expert
who will not testify at all at trial is subject to discovery only under
Rule 26(b)(4)(B) which requires "a showing of exceptional circumstances
under which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to ob-
tain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means. 40
It is interesting that as originally proposed Rule 26(b)(4) would have
spoken specifically to this issue. A preliminary draft of the 1970
amendments allowed free discovery by any means of an adverse par-
ty's expert but included the provision that "[d]iscovery of the expert's
opinions and the grounds therefor is restricted to those previously
given or those to be given on direct examination at trial."'1 As finally
adopted, there is free discovery of trial experts only through inter-
rogatories and further discovery by other means is only available upon
court order, subject to whatever restrictions the court may impose.
Noting the lack of guidance given to the court by the rule, one com-
mentator states that although the Advisory Committee Note is silent
as to the reason for that provision, "apparently it is thought that the
court may wish to restrict the deposition to the opinions that the ex-
pert is expected to give on direct examination at trial, and in this way
prevent the discovering party from using the deposition to establish
his own affirmative case." 2
The leading case on this subject agreed with that analysis. In Bailey
v. Meister Brau, Inc.," the plaintiff had retained an economic expert,
Professor Jame§ Lorie, to examine two issues-(1) the value of Meister
Brau stock involved in the case, and (2) the value of Black Company.
Lorie's testimony at trial was to be limited to the value of the Meister
Brau stock. The defendant moved for leave to depose Lorie on the
question of the value of Black Company and the court found itself con-
fronting the issue of whether Lorie should be treated as a "trial ex-
pert" or a "nontrial expert" for the purposes of the discovery motion.
In discussing the issue the court first noted that neither Rule 26(b)(4)
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B).
41. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules Relating to Deposition and
Discovery, November 1967, reprinted in 43 F.R.D. 211, 225-26 (1967).
42. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 2031 & n.78
(1970). For a discussion of changes between the proposed draft and the final version, see
Graham, supra note 5, at 915-16.
43. 57 F.R.D. 11 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
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nor the Advisory Committee Note to the 1970 amendments addressed
the issue of whether a party is entitled to discovery of the opposing
party's expert about matters other than those which the expert is ex-
pected to testify at trial." The court then went on to adopt the view
that where the expert is not expected to testify as to matters upon
which the opposing party seeks to depose him, the purpose behind the
greater discovery permitted by Rule 26(b)(4)(A) would not be served.' 5
After determining that the defendant had failed to meet the 26(b)(4)(B)
burden of showing exceptional circumstances, the court accordingly
denied the motion to depose Lorie about the value of Black Company.'"
In 1973, the District Court for the Southern District of New York
considered a very closely related matter and came to the same conclu-
sion. In Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co. v. Lumbermens Mutual
Casualty Co.,'" the court was dealing with a motion for production of
documents generated by plaintiff's expert accounting firm. The firm,
Price Waterhouse, actually occupied several different roles with
respect to the plaintiff. First of all, the firm was plaintiff's regular
auditor for many years. Secondly, it was specially employed to assist in
preparing a claim for damages in anticipation of litigation against
Lumbermens. In this latter capacity, Price Waterhouse prepared a
report in 1968 based on Inspiration's records and a report in 1970
based on metallurgical data supplied by Lumbermens' accountants.
Both reports dealt with the same subject matter, ie., Inspiration's loss
of profits resulting from an excavator collapse in 1960. The court, how-
ever, noted specifically that the 1970 report was written without refer-
ence to the 1968 file, was based on different data, and was thus not
"derived" from the 1968 matter."
At trial, Price Waterhouse was expected to testify as an expert only
in regard to the 1970 report. Defendant, however, moved the court to
compel production of documents relating to both the 1968 report and
the 1970 report. The court noted that "the Advisory Committee's
Notes on Rule 26(b)(4) are not helpful on the interpretation to be given
to an expert who wears two hats."'" It also noted that it was consider-
ing a slightly different question than the one presented in Bailey v.
Meister Brau, Inc., because the subject matter of both reports was the
same-loss of profits.' The court, left then to its own resources, relied
44. Id at 13-14.
45. Id at 14. The court noted that such a holding was consistent with the Advisory
Committee's purpose of allowing the discovery of expert opinions in order to permit im-
proved cross-examination and rebuttal of expert testimony. Id
46. Id
47. 60 F.R.D. 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
48. Id at 208 n.1.
49. Id at 210.
50. Id at 210 n.5.
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heavily upon policy considerations in coming to its conclusion that pro-
duction would be compelled only as to documents involving the 1970
report. One of the most important factors considered by the court was
the availability of the information from other sources. 1 Since there
was no exceptional showing that would have justified exposing com-
munications between the attorney and his expert, it followed that dis-
covery about matters beyond the scope of the expert's anticipated
testimony was not warranted. 2 The court concluded that an indepen-
dent accountant can serve two functions for purposes of Rule 26(b)(4)(B),
that of a general auditor who is subject to normal discovery, and that
of an expert retained specifically for litigation. In the latter case, dis-
covery respecting preparation of the claim is limited by Rule 26(b)(4)(B)
if the expert is not going to testify at trial.M
Commentators seem to agree that further discovery under Rule
26(b)(4)(A)(ii) should be limited to the subject matter on which the ex-
pert is expected to testify at trial. As noted earlier, the Bailey v.
Meister Brau, Inc. court referred to commentaries that "suggested"
that discovery under 26(b)(4)(A) should be limited to the subject matter
of the expert's testimony." Since the decisions in Bailey and Inspira-
tion Consolidated Copper Co., other commentators have accepted these
cases as logical and important qualifications to Rule 26(b)(4).M
In conclusion, it can be said with some degree of reliability that
courts will probably restrict discovery under Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) to the
subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify. This is con-
sistent with the history of the 1970 amendments to Rule 26 and with
the underlying policy of the rule to permit effective cross-examination
and rebuttal of expert testimony while not allowing the opponent to
make his own affirmative case by relying on his adversary's experts.
B. Discovery of Information from Other Members of an Expert's
Professional Firm
There is very little case law and no commentary dealing with the
situation in which an expert witness is a member of a professional firm
51. Id. at 210 ("In proper cases there are ample means of discovery available to the
opposing party, including audit and inspection by his own accountants of his adversary's
records, so that discovery of the opinion of the accountant for the opposing party is not
necessary").
52. Id. ("It is easy enough for the moving party to obtain his own expert opinion
based on the facts and figures discovered from the plaintiff's books and records").
53. Id.
54. The court cited 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
254 n.78 (1970) and Note, Discovery of Experts: A Historical Problem and a Proposed
FRCP Solution, 53 MINN. L. REV. 785, 803-04 (1969).
55. See Graham, supra note 5, at 930 n.133; Annot., 33 A.L.R. FED. 403, 440-41 (1977);
Discovery of Expert Information, supra note 24, at 718-19 & n.66.
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and discovery is sought of work done by other members of the firm.
The case most nearly on point is Seiffer v. Topsy's Internationa Inc. ,"
which involved alleged securities violations. Topsy's auditors, Touche,
Ross & Co., were third-party defendants in a third-party action
brought by the underwriters, Bear, Stearns & Co. A member of the
law firm representing Touche Ross & Co. asked Mr. John Van Camp, a
Touche, Ross & Co. partner, to assist in the litigation at hand. Mr. Van
Camp had not been involved in the particular audits that were the
basis of the action and was not expected to testify at trial. He acted
simply as an expert who was assisting counsel in the preparation of
the case. When the underwriters filed a motion to depose Van Camp,
Touche, Ross & Co. filed a motion for a protective order asking that
the deposition not be allowed since Van Camp was an expert specially
employed in anticipation of litigation under Rule 26(b)(4)(B). The court
was thus presented with the question of whether an individual partner
in an accounting firm could be considered an expert independently
from the firm itself.
The underwriters contended that since Touche, Ross & Co. was a
party and since Van Camp was a partner in that firm, he should also
be considered a party subject to deposition. In disagreeing, the court
noted that Rule 26 "overrides and limits the more general provisions
of the remaining discovery machinery described in Rules 27 through
37 .157 Ultimately the court concluded that Van Camp, even though a
partner in the accounting firm, had to be considered a Rule 26(b)(4)(B)
expert and thus the court refused to allow his deposition to be taken."
This is one area where the impact of Rule 612 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence 5 may be very significant. Rule 612 mandates the produc-
56. 69 F.R.D. 69 (D. Kan. 1975).
57. Id at 72.
58. Id at 72 & n.3.
59. FED. R. EVID. 612 provides as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in criminal proceedings by section 3500 of title 18,
United States Code, if a witness uses a writing to refresh his memory for the pur-
pose of testifying, either-
(1) while testifying, or
(2) before testifying, if the court in its discretion determines it is necessary in
the interests of justice,
an adverse party is entitled to have the writing produced at the hearing, to inspect
it, to cross-examine the witness thereon, and to introduce in evidence those por-
tions which relate to the testimony of the witness. If it is claimed that the writing
contains matters not related to the subject matter of the testimony the court shall
examine the writing in camera, excise any portions not so related, and order
delivery of the remainder to the party entitled thereto. Any portion withheld over
objections shall be preserved and made available to the appellate court in the event
of an appeal. If a writing is not produced or delivered pursuant to order under this
rule, the court shall make any order justice requires; except that in criminal cases
1980
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tion of all documents used to refresh the witness' memory while on the
witness stand and allows the court to compel production of all docu-
ments reviewed by a witness prior to testifying. This rule takes no
note of the author of the documents. Therefore, a report prepared by
the partner of an expert witness but reviewed by the expert witness
prior to trial is presumably subject to discovery if the court should
decide, in its judgment, that production is "necessary in the interests
of justice."" The court is apparently limited in its discretion under
Rule 612 to allowing access "only to those writings which may fairly be
said to have an impact upon the testimony of the witness.""1 Therefore,
work reviewed by the trial expert should only be subject to discovery
if it is relevant to the subject matter on which the trial expert will
testify.
In light of this it is reasonable to assume that if the trial expert
reviews work done by his partners or associates that is relevant to the
subject matter on which he will testify, the court would not be abusing
its discretion in compelling production of those writings by authority of
Rule 612. On the other hand, work done by a trial expert's partner or
associate and not reviewed by the trial expert should be immune from
discovery under evidentiary Rule 612 and arguably also under pro-
cedural Rule 26(b)(4). The primary purpose of both of these rules is to
ensure that the opposing party will have an adequate opportunity and
means to conduct effective cross-examination and rebuttal of an expert
witness' testimony. That purpose would not be served by permitting
discovery of work done by a trial expert's partner or associate, unless
that work has a direct relationship to the subject matter about which
the trial expert is expected to testify. To conclude otherwise would be
to invite a party to use Rule 612 and Rule 26(b)(4) as vehicles by which
that party can make his own case through discovery of his opponent's
expert information.2
C. Discovery of Materials Prepared by Counsel and Transmitted
to the Expert Witness
Another unsettled question concerns the status of materials pre-
pared by counsel and passed to an expert who is expected to testify at
when the prosecution elects not to comply, the order shall be one striking the testi-
mony or, if the court in its discretion determines that the interests of justice so re-
quire, declaring a mistrial.
60. Id.
61. See Advisory Committee Notes on Proposed Rule 612, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. app.
FED. R. EVID. 612 (1976).
62. But see United States v. International Business Machs. Corp., 81 F.R.D. 625
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (expert witness required to produce "client studies" which had been pre-
pared by persons employed in the firm of the witness, even though the witness did not in-
tend to rely on those studies in his testimony).
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trial. Where the expert is not expected to testify at trial and has been
specifically retained by counsel to assist in rendering legal services to
the client, it is likely that a claim of attorney-client privilege or attor-
ney work product protection will be recognized by the court."
The more interesting question arises when the expert is expected to
testify at trial. It has been held in an antitrust action that special pro-
tection under Rule 26(b)(4) is afforded only to information and
materials generated by the expert, and not to information flowing to
the expert from the client." The basis for this conclusion is the Ad-
visory Committee's Note to Rule 26(b)(4) which describes the section as
.&a new provision dealing with discovery of information (including facts
and opinions) obtained by a party from an expert retained by that
party in relation to litigation or obtained by the expert and not yet
transmitted to the party.""
If information transmitted to the trial expert is not protected under
Rule 26(b)(4). it can only be withheld from the adversary if it is pro-
tected under some other rule or for some other reason. The attorney-
client privilege and the work product doctrine may be potential
theories for shielding such material. However, Rule 612 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, which mandates production of writings used by a
witness to refresh his memory while testifying and which allows the
court to compel production of all writings referred to by a witness
prior to testifying, can be invoked by the court or the discovering
party to counter these arguments. Rule 612 has been specifically held
to override the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine
in the case of writings referred to by a party during his deposition."
As to materials referred to by a witness prior to testifying, it is
very unlikely that the work product doctrine will be considered a valid
objection to discovery if the trial expert has actually relied on these
materials in forming the opinions on which he will testify and if the
court, in its discretion, decides pursuant to Rule 612 that the adver-
sary should be entitled to see all materials reviewed by the witness
prior to testifying. This conclusion is based largely on language from
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.' The court in that case was
considering a motion to compel production of notebooks personally pre-
pared by Kodak's attorney, John Doar, in anticipation of trial. Some of
63. See Levy, supra note 30, at 3 (citing United States v. Schmidt, 360 F. Supp. 339
(M.D. Pa. 1973)). See also Annot., 33-A.L.R. FED. 403, 431 (1977).
64. United States v. International Business Machs. Corp., 72 F.R.D. 78, 81-82
(S.D.N.Y. 1976). See also Annot., 33 A.L.R. FED. 403, 431 (1977).
65. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Dis-
covery, Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 26, 48 F.R.D. 487, 503 (1970) (emphasis added).
66. Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 57 F.R.D. 11, 13 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
67. 74 F.R.D. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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the expert witnesses that Kodak expected to call at trial had been per-
mitted to refer to these notebooks as an additional source of factual in-
formation in developing the opinions on which they were to testify.
The magistrate to whom the discovery motions had been referred by
the court ordered the notebooks to be produced. There is no question
but that these notebooks contained highly sensitive information. Ac-
cording to Doar's affidavit they consisted of his synthesis of the facts
and factual issues and represented his "legal analysis, mental impres-
sions and ... legal judgment as to what facts were needed to be under-
stood, mastered, and possibly presented in the trial of the Berkey
case.""
Ultimately, the district court did not compel discovery of the Doar
notebooks. Two major considerations played an important part in its
decision. First of all, the court questioned whether the Doar notebooks
could really be said to have had a significant impact on the expert's
opinions. Apparently, the experts had only referred to the notebooks
when trying to get a grasp of the overall factual and historical picture
in order to put into context the specific questions to which they were
asked to respond. As a second consideration, the court noted the
highly sensitive nature of the notebooks and commented that "given
the current development of the law in this quarter, it seems fair to say
that counsel were not vividly aware of the potential for a stark choice
between withholding the notebooks from the experts or turning them
over to opposing counsel.""9
Although it refused to compel production of these materials, the
court sternly warned that in the future it would be very unwise for
counsel to rely upon the work product doctrine for protection of
materials submitted by counsel to a trial expert. The court proclaimed:
In this spirit, this court notes now, with hindsight, that there is not a
compelling rationale for the view that counsel may (1) deliver work prod-
uct to an expert or other witness to be "useful to the client," but then (2)
withhold the material from an adversary who seeks to exploit the facts of
this assistance in cross-examining the witness. From now on, as the prob-
lem and the pertinent legal materials become more familiar, there should
be a sharp discounting of the concerns on which defendant is prevailing
today. To put the point succinctly, there will be hereafter powerful reason
to hold that materials considered work product should be withheld from
prospective witnesses if they are to be withheld from opposing parties. 0
In the final analysis, the court's reasoning is consistent with the poli-
cies underlying Rule 612 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and Rule
68. . at 614.




26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under these rules the
court is granted the discretionary authority to limit discovery in order
to promote fairness, but it is clear that a party will not be permitted
to hide behind these rules when attempting to prepare its witnesses
with materials that it does not wish the adversary to see.
D. Applicability of Rules 612 and 705
of the Federal Rules of Evidence
Rule 612 has already been discussed in relation to the questions con-
cerning materials prepared by counsel and materials prepared by
other members of an expert witness' firm. It is clear that this rule can
have a significant impact on the scope of discovery of expert informa-
tion. In pertinent part the rule provides that
If a witness uses a writing to refresh his memory for the purpose of testi-
fying, either-(1) while testifying, or (2) before testifying, if the court in
its discretion determines it is necessary in the interests of justice, an
adverse party is entitled to have the writing produced at the hearing, to
inspect it, to cross-examine the witness thereon, and to introduce into
evidence those portions which relate to the testimony of the witness. 1
As has already been indicated above, Rule 612 has been held to over-
ride the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine as to
materials referred to by a witness while testifying." In addition, the
district court in Berkey has warned that the work product doctrine
will not protect writings prepared by counsel and passed to a trial ex-
pert if the materials are referred to by a witness prior to testifying.
Therefore, depending on the predisposition of the particular judge,
Rule 612's grant of discretionary authority to compel production of any
writing used prior to trial in preparation for testifying may have a
significant impact on the scope of discovery of expert information.
Rule 612 should not, however, be construed so as to allow discovery
of materials which do not relate specifically to the subject matter on
which the expert will testify.7 ' Thus, Rule 612 should not have a signifi-
cant bearing on the question of discoverability of work done by a trial
expert on areas of the case as to which he will not testify.
71. FED. R. EVID. 612.
72. Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 57 F.R.D. 11, 13 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
73. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613, 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
74. As the Advisory Committee noted:
The purpose of the phrase "for the purpose of testifying" is to safeguard against
using the rule as a pretext for wholesale exploration of an opposing party's files
and to insure that access is limited only to those writings which may fairly be said
in fact to have an impact upon the testimony of the witness.




Rule 705 should not have a significant bearing on any of the ques-
tions presented." The Advisory Committee Notes reveal that this rule
was designed primarily to govern presentation of expert testimony at
trial and not to affect the scope of discovery of expert information. In
particular, the rule was designed to eliminate the need for the hypo-
thetical question as a basis for presenting an expert opinion and to
shift to the cross-examiner the responsibility of bringing out the under-
lying data supporting the expert opinion. The Advisory Committee
Notes specifically refer to Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure as the means by which the cross-examiner should be able to
prepare for his interrogation of the witness." There are no cases in
which Rule 705 has been discussed in relation to the question of the
scope of discovery of expert information pursuant to Rule 26(b)(4) or
evidentiary Rule 612. Thus, it can be concluded that Rule 705 will prob-
ably not serve to expand the scope of discovery allowed under Rule
26(b)(4) or Rule 612.
III. PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES
Since the scope of discovery under Rule 26(b)(4) and Rule 612 is left
up to the discretion of the court, there is no way to absolutely insure
that a particular item prepared by an expert or submitted to an expert
will not be subject to discovery. The court may, in its discretion,
choose to order virtually unlimited discovery of expert information
pursuant to Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii)." The Quadrini example does not appear,
however, to be the general rule. For the most part, courts tend to
balance the interests of a party in maintaining the confidentiality
necessary to obtaining good expert advice and testimony against the
interest of the opposing party in terms of adequate preparation for
cross-examination and rebuttal of expert testimony.
The factors that courts have considered in the past were discussed
in an earlier section of this article. In summary, the courts appear to
take note of the fact that the nature of the litigation may make it
necessary for a party to reveal sensitive information to its experts and
most courts do not appear anxious to penalize the party for using the
expert. Rather, the courts are often influenced in their decisions on the
75. Rule 705 provides: "The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and
give his reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless
the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the
underlying facts or data on cross-examination." FED. R. EVID. 705.
76. Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. app.
FED. R. EVID. 612 (1976).




scope of discovery by precautions taken by a party and its counsel to
preserve the integrity and confidentiality of information flowing to and
work generated by experts. Thus, the following suggestions are in
order:
(1) If at all possible, the expert should be an outside expert,
not an in-house expert, and should understand that he is being re-
tained specifically in preparation for litigation.
(2) Counsel, rather than client, should retain the expert so as
to emphasize the point that the expert is assisting in the rendi-
tion of legal services.
(3) Work done by the expert should be in response to specific
questions presented by counsel.
(4) Information received by the expert should be maintained
in separate, confidential files and not intermingled with the ex-
pert's ordinary business files.
(5) Reports or other materials generated by the expert should
be sent directly to counsel and appropriately marked "For Infor-
mation of Counsel" or something to that effect.
All of these suggestions are obviously designed to emphasize the confi-
dential and sensitive nature of the information flowing to and from the
expert.
In some courts, it will be helpful to be very liberal in answers to in-
terrogatories concerning the expert's expected testimony. This has
persuaded some courts in the past that the adversary already has ade-
quate information to prepare for cross-examination and rebuttal of the
expert."8 Since many courts are willing to restrict the scope of dis-
covery under Rule 26(b)(4) to the subject matter on which the expert
will testify, it may be helpful to carefully identify materials generated
by the experts according to the area of the case with which the expert
will deal. Therefore, the following suggestions may be considered:
(1) Reports or other materials generated by the expert should
clearly indicate the question in response to which they were pre-
pared.
(2) Such reports could also indicate what sources of informa-
tion were consulted in their preparation.
(3) Perhaps even greater segregation could be achieved by re-
taining different members of the expert firm for different areas
of preparation.
As to materials prepared by counsel and passed to the expert, the best
advice is that if the expert will testify on a subject to which the
78. See, e.g., Wilson v. Resnick, 51 F.R.D. 510 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
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materials prepared by counsel are related then counsel should be very
careful to eliminate as much sensitive information as possible from the
materials and should make the decision, before passing any such
materials to the expert, that the beneficial impact on the expert's testi-
mony is greater than any possible detrimental effect of allowing the
adversary to see the materials. If materials are so sensitive that their
disclosure must be avoided, counsel should not permit them to be
reviewed by a trial expert.
In conclusion, it bears reiteration that none of these measures can
guarantee that an individual judge will not exercise his discretion in
such a way as to permit extraordinarily broad discovery of expert-
related information. Nonetheless, these measures, and other measures
conceived by imaginative counsel, can at least reduce the risk that sen-
sitive and otherwise non-responsive information will be unnecessarily
disclosed.
